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NEWS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
Part III—ICTR
by Alexandra L. Wisotsky*
General
In November 2000, the UN Security Council passed Reso-
lution 1329, increasing by two the number of judges to the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The Pres-
ident of the ICTR will now select two of the Tribunal’s eleven
judges to sit on the common Appeals Chamber. During 2000,
six indicted suspects were transferred to the UN Detention
Facility in Arusha, Tanzania: political leader Kamuhanda, reli-
gious leader Ntakirutimana, and military leaders Ndindiliyi-
mana, Nzuwonemeye, Muvunyi, and Sagahutu.
From December 1, 1999, to December 31, 2000, the Appeals
Chamber issued judgements in the Serushago case and the Kam-
banda case, and issued a decision in the Barayagwiza case, one
of several interlocutory appeals. It
heard oral arguments in the appeals
of both Akayesu and Kayishema &
Ruzindana, although no judgements
have yet been rendered. The ICTR
Trial Chambers rendered judge-
ments on the merits in the Ruta-
ganda and Musema cases, and one
judgement after a guilty plea in the
case against the Belgian national,
Ruggiu. The trial was completed in
the Bagilishema case, but no judge-
ment has yet been delivered. At the end of 2000, ongoing pro-
ceedings before the ICTR Trial Chambers included the case
against Ntagerura, Bagambiki, and Imanishimwe (known as
the “Cyangugu” case), the Semanza trial, and the trial against




Omar Serushago pled guilty to genocide and crimes against
humanity (murder, extermination, and torture), and was sen-
tenced by Trial Chamber I to 15 years imprisonment in February
1999. Serushago appealed his sentence before the Appeals
Chamber, which upheld the Trial Chamber in a written deci-
sion on April 6, 2000, in the case of Omar Serushago v. The Pros-
ecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-39-A.  
The Appellant argued that the imposed sentence should
be reduced because the Trial Chamber failed to give due weight
to the mitigating factors in the case, and because the sentence
was excessive in light of the sentencing practices of Rwandan
courts.
The Appeals Chamber found no merit in the Appellant’s first
argument. Although Article 23 of the Statute of the Tribunal
(Statute) and Rule 101 of the Rules of the Tribunal outline the
factors that a Trial Chamber must consider in sentencing, they
leave the due weight to be attached to each to the discretion of
the Trial Chamber. The Appeals Chamber held that with respect
to the weight accorded to mitigating factors, the Appellant
failed to show that the Trial Chamber committed any error.
Regarding Appellant’s second argument on appeal, the
Appeals Chamber found that although Article 23 allows the Trial
Chamber to take into consideration the practices of Rwandan
courts regarding prison sentences, it does not require the Trial
Chamber to conform to those practices. Thus, the Appeals
Chamber found that a 15 year sentence was proper. The Appeals
Chamber held that although it has the power under Article 24
to change a sentence imposed by a Trial Chamber, it should not
exercise such power in the absence of an error of discretion, or
a failure to apply the applicable law on the part of the Trial
Chamber. 
Barayagwiza
In November 1999, the Appeals Chamber issued a decision
to release Jean Bosco Barayagwiza following his motion chal-
lenging the legality of his arrest and detention. The Appeals
Chamber dismissed the indictment with prejudice and ordered
Barayagwiza returned to Cameroon, where he had been arrested.
The decision was based on violations of Barayagwiza’s rights as
a result of the length of his deten-
tion without charge or appearance
before the Tribunal. After a request
by the Prosecutor, a somewhat dif-
ferently constituted Appeals Cham-
ber reviewed the initial decision.
Based on new evidence, the Appeals
Chamber reversed its decision on
March 31, 2000, in Barayagwiza v.
The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-
AR72.
The Prosecutor requested review
pursuant to Article 25 of the Statute, and Rules 120 and 121 of
the Rules of the Tribunal. Article 25 permits either party to sub-
mit a request to review a decision if a new fact was discovered
that was not known at the time of the proceedings and could
have been a determinative factor in the decision. Rule 120
allows either party to move the Tribunal to reconsider or review
its judgement where a newly discovered fact was not known to,
and could not have been discovered through due diligence
by, the moving party at the time of the initial proceedings.
Rule 121 requires that the Tribunal review and revise its judge-
ment if it finds the new fact could have been outcome deter-
minative.
The Appeals Chamber considered the distinction between
“genuinely new facts which may justify review and additional evi-
dence of a fact” previously considered, and held that a new fact
may be one that occurred prior to the trial. Next, the Appeals
Chamber found that the Article 25 right to appeal attaches
after a conviction as well as after the dismissal of a preliminary
motion before a Trial Chamber. Additionally, although a request
for review may only be considered where there is a final judge-
ment, the November decision was effectively a final judgement,
since it dismissed the indictment, thereby terminating
proceedings. 
In considering the merits of the case, the Appeals Chamber
affirmed the factual basis of its November 1999 decision. The
Appeals Chamber divided the detention of Barayagwiza into
three periods and examined each period to determine whether
there was a violation of his rights. The periods included the ten
months covering his arrest in Cameroon and the extradition pro-
cedure; the nine-month delay in the request for Barayagwiza’s
continued on next page
The Appeals Chamber revoked
Barayagwiza’s release and determined that
violations of his rights should be remedied
at trial. If found guilty, Barayagwiza will
serve a reduced sentence; if acquitted, 
he will receive financial compensation.
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provisional detention through his transfer to the detention
center in Arusha; and the three months between his arrival at
the detention unit in Arusha and his initial appearance before
the Tribunal.
First, based on the discussion of the ICTR’s extradition
request before the Cameroonian courts, the Appeals Chamber
concluded that Barayagwiza knew the general nature of the
charges against him by May 1996 at the latest. Thus, Barayag-
wiza spent 18 days in detention without knowledge of the
charges against him. This delay violated the Accused’s right to
be expeditiously informed of the charges against him. The
Appeals Chamber noted, however, that an 18-day delay is far less
onerous than a 10-month delay. 
Second, a report by the Supreme Court of Cameroon indi-
cated that while the extradition request was submitted imme-
diately to the President of Cameroon, a delay resulted from
scheduled national elections. Thus, the human rights viola-
tions of Barayagwiza in Cameroon were not attributable to the
Prosecutor.  
Third, while Barayagwiza was detained in Arusha, schedul-
ing problems with the Defense delayed his initial appearance
before the Tribunal. The Appeals Chamber, however, found that
only 20 days elapsed from the time the Defense initially agreed
to appear to the date of actual appearance. Nonetheless, the
Chamber held that there was still a substantial delay in violation
of the Accused’s rights. 
Thus, the Appeals Chamber found that the new facts about
Barayagwiza’s arrest and detention significantly reduced the fail-
ings of the Prosecutor, and the severity of the violations of the
accused’s rights. Additionally, the new facts could have impacted
the decision of the Chamber. In light of this, the Chamber
found the remedy issued in the November 1999 order was dis-
proportionate to the events. The Appeals Chamber revoked
Barayagwiza’s release and determined that violations of his
rights should be remedied at trial. If found guilty, Barayagwiza




On December 6, 1999, Trial Chamber I sentenced Georges
Rutaganda to life imprisonment in The Prosecutor v. Georges
Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T. Ruta-
ganda was charged with genocide, crimes against humanity
(extermination and murder), and violations of Common Arti-
cle 3 to the Geneva Conventions (murder). He pled not guilty
on all counts.  
The Trial Chamber found that Rutaganda, second vice-pres-
ident of the youth wing of the Interahamwe, participated in vio-
lence against Tutsis by distributing weapons to members of the
Interahamwe, ordering the killing of Tutsi civilians and refugees,
and forcibly transferring Tutsi refugees. The Trial Chamber also
found that Rutaganda personally killed Emmanuel Kayitare, a
Tutsi refugee. Although the Interahamwe separated Tutsis at
roadblocks and took them to Rutaganda’s garage, it was not
established that Rutaganda himself erected and stationed Inter-
ahamwe members at roadblocks near his garage. 
Rutaganda was charged with individual criminal responsibility
under Article 6(1) of the Statute. The Trial Chamber found that
responsibility under Article 6(1) is incurred either as a princi-
pal, or for the acts of others, and that responsibility results
from the planning, instigating, ordering, committing, or aiding
and abetting of a crime punishable under Articles 2-4 of the
Statute. Participation includes an unlawful act or a failure of a
duty to act. Because attempted genocide (Article 2(3) of the
Statute) is an inchoate crime, individual criminal responsibil-
ity is incurred regardless of the result.
With respect to the genocide charge, the Trial Chamber
held that the special “genocidal” intent of the perpetrator is
inferred from evidence such as the scale and general nature of
the crimes, and the Accused’s patterns of conduct. Given the
widespread violence against Tutsis throughout Rwanda and
Rutaganda’s participation in, and authorization of, attacks
against Tutsis, the Chamber held him individually criminally
responsible under Article 6(1). 
In considering the charges of crimes against humanity, the
Trial Chamber addressed the issue of cumulative charges arising
from the same acts. Adopting the test in the Akayesu Judgement,
the Trial Chamber held that a perpetrator may be convicted for
multiple offenses relating to the same set of facts where the
offenses have different elements, where the laws protect differ-
ent interests, or where it is necessary to record a conviction for
both offenses in order to fully describe the acts. The Prosecutor
indicted Rutaganda on one count of extermination and three
counts of murder as crimes against humanity. The primary dif-
ference between the two crimes is that murder involves the inten-
tional killing of a person, while extermination is a crime against
a group of people and requires an element of mass destruction
that is not necessary for murder. Because murder and extermi-
nation share the same elements, and the count of extermination
and one of the counts of murder arose from the same act, the Trial
Chamber chose to hold Rutaganda responsible only for exter-
mination with regards to that act. The Trial Chamber did, how-
ever, find Rutaganda guilty of murder as a crime against human-
ity for other acts, namely aiding and abetting in the detention of
Tutsis and killing Emmanuel Kayitare, a Tutsi refuge.
Finally, the Trial Chamber considered the applicability of
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, punishable
under Article 4 of the Statute. Given the nature of the conflict,
the Trial Chamber adopted the “evaluation test,” under which
the intensity and organization of the parties to the conflict are
considered in order to determine whether an armed conflict
existed. There must also be a nexus between the Accused’s
acts and the armed conflict. The Trial Chamber found that an
internal armed conflict existed at the time of Rutaganda’s acts,
the population under attack was protected, and Rutaganda
had sufficient authority to be held responsible under Article 4.
The Trial Chamber was not convinced, however, that Ruta-
ganda acted in support of the armed conflict. Nor could the Trial
Chamber rely solely on the finding of genocide to establish vio-
lations of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II. Thus, Ruta-
ganda was acquitted on the war crimes charges. 
In sentencing Rutaganda to life imprisonment, the Trial
Chamber considered the seriousness of the crimes, his position
of authority, his leading role in the execution of the crimes, and
his lack of remorse.
Musema
On January 27, 2000, Trial Chamber I sentenced Alfred
Musema to life imprisonment, in Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, The
Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema. Musema was indicted for genocide,
complicity in genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, crimes
against humanity (extermination, murder, rape, and “other
inhumane acts”), and violations of Protocol II and Common Arti-
cle 3 to the Geneva Conventions. He pled not guilty on all
counts.
ICTR, continued from previous page
continued on next page
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Musema, a political and economic leader in his préfecture, was
held responsible for committing, and ordering his subordi-
nates to commit, attacks on Tutsi refugees. He provided trans-
portation and weapons during certain attacks on Tutsis. After
one such attack, he raped a Tutsi woman; whether he ordered
others to commit rape was not proven.
Musema was charged with individual criminal responsibility
under Article 6(1) of the Statute, as well as with superior respon-
sibility under Article 6(3). Superior responsibility under Article
6(3) attaches when the accused “knew or had reason to know”
that the subordinate was about to commit, or had committed,
a criminal act, and  “failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof.” The Trial Chamber held that those with authority
over others, whether military or civilian, may incur superior crim-
inal responsibility for violations of international humanitarian
law. A civilian may be convicted of superior responsibility only
where he had either de jure or de facto control over the persons
committing the violations. The Trial Chamber found that by
virtue of his position, Musema held effective control over the
events alleged, and that he had the ability and responsibility to
take reasonable measures to prevent or punish the perpetrators
of crimes. Thus, Musema could incur both individual and supe-
rior criminal responsibility under Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of the
Statute.
Musema was found guilty of participating or aiding in some
of the attacks against Tutsi refugees, but he was not found
guilty of all the acts alleged. Complicity in genocide, the Trial
Chamber held, requires the accomplice to have knowingly or
voluntarily associated himself with the principal who commit-
ted the act. Since it is impossible to act as both the principal and
the accomplice in the commission of an act, the Trial Chamber
held that Musema could not be held responsible for both geno-
cide and complicity in genocide on the same facts. The Trial
Chamber found Musema to have acted with genocidal intent.
Additionally, as his acts were consistent with the ongoing pat-
tern of widespread and systematic attacks on the Tutsi civilian
population, Musema was also found guilty of crimes against
humanity for extermination and rape. The Prosecutor failed to
establish, however, Musema’s guilt of crimes against humanity
for “other inhumane acts” because the allegations required
more specificity than provided. Finally, despite the existence of
an internal armed conflict, the Trial Chamber did not find a
nexus existed between Musema’s acts and the armed conflict;
therefore, he was found not guilty of war crimes.
In imposing a sentence of life imprisonment, the Trial Cham-
ber considered the seriousness of the crimes, Musema’s leading role
in the acts, and his failure to use his authority to take reasonable
measures to prevent the crimes or punish the perpetrators. 
Ruggiu
On June 1, 2000, Trial Chamber I issued its written decision
in The Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, fol-
lowing a guilty plea entered by the Accused. This case marks the
first against a European involved in the Rwandan conflict. 
As a Belgian journalist, Ruggiu broadcast discriminatory and
threatening remarks against Tutsis, moderate Hutus, and Belgians,
knowing that these broadcasts would incite mass violence. Rug-
giu pled guilty to direct and public incitement to commit geno-
cide under Article 2(3)(c) of the Statute, and to crimes against
humanity (persecution) under Article 3(h) of the Statute. 
The Trial Chamber considered the nature and gravity of the
crimes, the use of mass media as a tool to mobilize and incite
the population to commit crimes and encourage ethnic hatred
and violence, and the extent of Ruggiu’s involvement. The
Trial Chamber found, however, that Ruggiu was a subordinate
at the radio station and played no part in making editorial pol-
icy. The Trial Chamber further considered that Ruggiu’s guilty
plea and cooperation with the Prosecution showed a desire to
take responsibility for his acts. Moreover, Ruggiu expressed
remorse for his acts. After weighing the aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances, the Trial Chamber sentenced Ruggiu to
12 years on each count, to be served concurrently.
*Alexandra L. Wisotsky is a 1997 graduate of the Washington Col-
lege of Law and a lawyer associated with the War Crimes Research Office.
Part IV—ICTY (2001)
by Kelly D. Askin*
Kunarac Judgement
Sexual slavery during the Bosnian conflict
The Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have
handed down several important decisions already this year,
though perhaps none is as momentous as the Kunarac Judge-
ment. On February 22, 2001, Trial Chamber II of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) ren-
dered an historic first in Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al., Case
No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, by finding two of the accused
guilty of enslavement and rape as crimes against humanity for
what effectively constituted sexual slavery. The original indict-
ment was against eight Serbs accused of a variety of sex crimes
committed against predominately Bosnian Muslim detainees in
the municipality of Fovca. The indictment alone was unique in
its exclusive focus on sex crimes. This trial was against three of
the accused who had been arrested and transferred to the Tri-
bunal’s detention unit in The Hague: Dragoljub Kunarac,
Radomir Kova vc, and Zoran Vukovi´c.
Kunarac, commander of a special reconnaissance unit of the
Bosnian Serb Army, was accused of torture, rape, and enslave-
ment as crimes against humanity, and torture, rape, and outrages
upon personal dignity as violations of the laws or customs of war.
Kova vc, a sub-commander of the military police and a paramil-
itary leader in Fo vca, was charged with enslavement and rape as
crimes against humanity, and rape and outrages upon personal
dignity as violations of the laws or customs of war. Vukovi´c,
also a sub-commander of the military police and a paramilitary
ICTR, continued from previous page
continued on next page
The Trial Chamber found that by virtue of
his position, Musema held effective control
over the events alleged, and that he had the
ability and responsibility to take reasonable
measures to prevent or punish the
perpetrators of crimes. Thus, Musema
could incur both individual and superior
criminal responsibility under Articles 6(1)
and 6(3) of the Statute.
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leader in Fo vca, was charged with torture and rape as crimes
against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war.
All crimes were linked to sexual violence. The convictions for
torture and enslavement were based on evidence demonstrat-
ing that the victims had been tortured by means of rape or
enslaved primarily to effectuate continuous rape. The outrages
upon personal dignity conviction was based on conduct includ-
ing forcing three girls to dance naked on a table for the soldiers’
entertainment.
The evidence established that the accused physically raped and
enslaved several women and girls, and had also facilitated rape
and sexual slavery perpetrated by others by taking victims to
locations where they would be systematically raped or by acts such
as loaning, trading, or selling the women to others. Many victims
were gang-raped publicly while detained in various homes,
schools, and gyms before being taken to other locations where
they were enslaved and repeatedly
raped by the accused or other sol-
diers for periods varying between days
or months at a time.
Article 3 of the ICTY Statute grants
the Tribunal jurisdiction to prose-
cute violations of the laws or customs
of war. The indictment alleged that
the accused committed outrages
upon personal dignity, rape, and tor-
ture in contravention of Common
Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions. Summarizing the general
requirements for applying Common
Article 3, the Judgement, in reliance
on jurisprudence of the Tribunal, noted: “(i) The violation must
constitute an infringement of a rule of international humanitarian
law. (ii) The rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to
treaty law, the required conditions must be met. (iii) The viola-
tion must be ‘serious’, that is to say, it must constitute a breach
of a rule protecting important values, and the breach must
involve grave consequences for the victim. (iv) The violation of
the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, the
individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule.
(v) There must be a close nexus between the violations and the
armed conflict. (vi) The violations must be committed against per-
sons taking no active part in the hostilities.”
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute grants the Tribunal jurisdiction
to prosecute crimes against humanity. The Judgement noted that
in addition to the statutory requirement of an armed conflict,
the following sub-elements are encompassed by the crime: “(i)
There must be an attack. (ii) The acts of the perpetrator must
be part of the attack. (iii) The attack must be ‘directed against
any civilian population’. (iv) The attack must be ‘widespread or
systematic’. (v) The perpetrator must know of the wider context
in which his acts occur and know that his acts are part of the
attack.” Applying these criteria to Article’s 3 and 5 of the Statute,
the Tribunal was satisfied that the prerequisite conditions were
established in each instance sustaining a guilty verdict.
Rape
The Trial Chamber generally accepted the elements of rape
that were promulgated in the ICTY Furund vzija case, as: “(i) the
sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of
the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object
used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by
the penis of the perpetrator; (ii) by coercion or force or threat
of force against the victim or a third person.” However, the Trial
Chamber clarified that it understood paragraph (ii) to include
factors that would render sexual penetration non-consensual or
non-voluntary. The Trial Chamber thus interpreted paragraph
(ii) to mean “where such sexual penetration occurs without the
consent of the victim.” It stressed that such consent must be
“given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will, assessed
in the context of the surrounding circumstances.” The focus
should be on serious violations of sexual autonomy, which
occurs when “the person subjected to the act has not freely
agreed to it or is otherwise not a voluntary participant”; factors
such as force, threats, or taking advantage of a person provide
evidence that genuine consent is absent. Indeed, the Trial
Chamber stated that proof of force, threat of force, or coercion
were not elements of rape imposed by international law. The
Judgement noted that the relevant factors tend to fall into
three categories: “(i) the sexual activity is accompanied by force
or threat of force to the victim or a third party; (ii) the sexual
activity is accompanied by force or a variety of other specified
circumstances which made the vic-
tim particularly vulnerable or
negated her ability to make an
informed refusal; or (iii) the sexual
activity occurs without the consent of
the victim.” The mens rea of rape is
the intent to effect the sexual pen-
etration coupled with the knowl-
edge that it occurs without the vic-
tim’s consent.
Torture
The Trial Chamber concluded
that the definitions of torture under
international humanitarian law and
international human rights law differ somewhat. Under cus-
tomary international law, the elements of torture in international
humanitarian law are: “(i) The infliction, by act or omission, of
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental. (ii) The
act or omission must be intentional. (iii) The act or omission
must aim at obtaining information or a confession, or at pun-
ishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or
at discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third
person.” The Trial Chamber emphasized that international
law provides no privilege that would shield state actors or rep-
resentatives from individual criminal responsibility, and indeed,
acting in an official capacity would “constitute an aggravating
circumstance” at the sentencing phase due to their abuse of
power.
Outrages upon personal dignity
The offense of outrages upon personal dignity is found in
Common Article 3(1)(c) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
which prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment.” The scope of this crime
was deemed to require: “(i) that the accused intentionally com-
mitted or participated in an act or omission which would be gen-
erally considered to cause serious humiliation, degradation or
otherwise be a serious attack on human dignity, and (ii) that he
knew that the act or omission could have that effect.” The Trial
Chamber rejected any requirement that the suffering would
need to be “lasting” or that the accused knew of the actual
consequences of his or her act.
Enslavement 
This trial represented the first time the Tribunal has had the
occasion to consider the law and application of enslavement as a
ICTY, continued from previous page
continued on next page
The evidence established that the accused
physically raped and enslaved several
women and girls, and had also facilitated
rape and sexual slavery perpetrated by
others by taking victims to locations where
they would be systematically raped or by
acts such as loaning, trading, or selling the
women to others.
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crime against humanity. After reviewing the treatment of
enslavement in domestic laws, conventions, and customary inter-
national law, the Trial Chamber determined that at the time rel-
evant to the indictment, the crime of enslavement in customary
international law consisted of “the exercise of any or all of the pow-
ers attaching to the right of ownership over a person.” The mens
rea is satisfied if such powers are exercised intentionally.
In determining whether enslavement has been established,
the Trial Chamber cited a variety of
indicators that could be considered,
such as control, lack of consent,
exploitation, compulsory labor, and
the accruing of some gain to the
perpetrator. “Sex” and “control of
sexuality” were two of the many
other factors cited as possible indi-
cators of enslavement. The Trial
Chamber opined that “[d]etaining or keeping someone in cap-
tivity, without more, would, depending on the circumstances of
a case, usually not constitute enslavement.” 
Cumulative convictions
This issue concerns whether an accused can be found guilty
of more than one offense for the same conduct. The Trial
Chamber cited the Appeals Chamber Judgement in the
v
Celebic´i
case, which allowed cumulative convictions for the same conduct
provided there are different statutory provisions that have a
“materially distinct element not contained in the other,” such
that one “requires proof of a fact not required by the other.”
Applying this approach to the case at hand, the Trial Chamber
found that Article 3 and Article 5 of the Statute have at least one
“materially distinct element that does not appear in the other.”
It noted that convictions for torture and rape for the same
conduct are also permissible as they too have materially distinct
elements. 
Verdicts and Sentences
Kunarac was acquitted of responsibility as a superior for
crimes committed by persons under his authority because the
Trial Chamber concluded that it was not sufficiently proven that
“the soldiers who committed the offences in the Indictment were
under the effective control of Kunarac at the time they com-
mitted the offences.” All convictions were based solely on indi-
vidual criminal responsibility, crimes that the accused either com-
mitted physically or were otherwise responsible for facilitating.
Each was acquitted of some charges, usually based on failure of
the prosecution to prove the crime
or the accused’s responsibility for it
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Kunarac was found guilty on 11
counts: three counts of rape as a
crime against humanity, four counts
of rape as a violation of the laws or
customs of war, one count of enslave-
ment as a crime against humanity,
one count of torture as a crime against humanity, and two
counts of torture as a violation of the laws or customs of war. He
received a single sentence of 28 years imprisonment.
Kova vc was found guilty on four counts: one count each for
rape as a crime against humanity and a violation of the laws or
customs of war, enslavement as a crime against humanity, and
outrages upon personal dignity as a violation of the laws or cus-
toms of war. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.
Vukovi´c was found guilty on four counts: one count each for
rape and torture as crimes against humanity and rape and tor-
ture as violations of the laws or customs of war. He received a
sentence of 12 years imprisonment. 
*Kelly D. Askin is the acting executive director of the War Crimes
Research Office at the Washington College of Law. 
ICTY, continued from previous page
than they were in East Timor. India and Pakistan have fought
three wars over Kashmir. Both possess, and have tested, nuclear
weapons and over 34,000 people have died in Kashmir in the
past ten years. Therefore, UN intervention in support of the right
to self-determination is justified in Kashmir through the exam-
ple of East Timor.
Finally, even if these arguments are not sufficient legal jus-
tification, the principles now recognized in international law—
that massive, systematic human rights violations or a lack of rep-
resentation within an existing State create a right to
secession—support calls for international action in Kashmir. As
outlined above, all human rights bodies unequivocally agree that
human rights are massively and systematically denied in Indian-
held Kashmir and that the Kashmiri people have no recourse
within the Indian union for exercising their right of self-
determination. 
Conclusion
The modern development of the right to self-determina-
tion, especially in East Timor, requires the people of Kashmir
be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination. Secu-
rity Council resolutions addressing the scope of the right to self-
determination, in combination with State practice, indicate
the right should be implemented through an impartial plebiscite,
thereby enabling the Kashmiri people to freely determine their
future. Finally, following East Timor’s example, if the parties do
not cooperate in creating conditions allowing the Kashmiri
people to enjoy the right to self-determination, the threat to
international peace caused by the mass violations of human
rights in Kashmir provides clear legal justification for interna-
tional intervention to implement the right. Indeed, until the
group right to self-determination, which the Human Rights
Commission states is essential to the effective guarantee of indi-
vidual rights, is realized in Kashmir, it is likely the mass viola-
tions of individual rights will continue. 
*Amardeep Singh is an LL.M. candidate at the Washington College
of Law and associate editor for the Human Rights Brief.
Kashmir, continued from  page 11
. . . convictions for torture and rape for the
same conduct are also permissable as they
too have materially distinct elements.
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